From the Symposium sponsored by the Friends of Clermont,
Bard College/Hudson Valley Studies Program,
and the New York State Office of Parks,
Recreation, & Historic Preservation,
Taconic Region,
June 6-7, 1986
Robert R. Livingston
and the American Revolution
by Lorna Skaaren
The American Revolution meant different things
to different people. This was true within the
Livingston family, even within one generation.
For Robert R. Livingston, Jr., it meant serving the
public good in government and aspiring to a high-level position; for his brother Henry, it meant
participation in the cause of the Revolution as an
officer; for their younger brother, John Robert
Livingston, the third son of Margaret Beekman and
Judge Robert Livingston, it represented an
opportunity for personal financial aggrandizement.
The experience of John R. Livingston (1775-1851)
provides fascinating insight into what it meant to
be a merchant in the Revolutionary period in
America.
John R. Livingston is an obscure figure in the
history of the Revolution because his official
participation was minimal and he held no public
office. Edwin Brockholst Livingston’s The
Livingstons of Livingston Manor tells us that John
served briefly with the Manor Militia and held a
commission for purchase of army supplies until
early 1777. [1] What became of him after this date?
He came to see the Revolution as a chance to make
his fortune and sought any possible lucrative
venture to reach that end. John saw no need to
divide his time between public and private pursuits
as his cousin Walter Livingston did. Rather, he
focused his full energy on privateering and trade.
This paper seeks to examine John’s life during the
Revolution and to argue that aspects of his
opportunism contributed to the struggle for and
victory of America's independence.
With the outbreak of the Revolution, John at
twenty-one years of age became Captain of the
Livingston Manor Militia and was soon promoted to
Major. Overseeing the militia members posed only
frustrations as he found many of the tenants with
Tory views and thus unruly and unwilling to do or
go where they were ordered. More rewarding,
perhaps, was his investment of time in a powder
making business. In early 1776, the New York
Provincial Government announced a need for gun
powder mills in various counties and offered loans
for their construction. John responded and built a
mill in Dutchess County. [2] In May 1776, Egbert
Benson, Chairman of the Dutchess County Committee,
reported to the Congress that Livingston’s mill
passed inspection and produced a good amount of gun
powder within a week’s time. [3] Between June 1777
and June 1778, the mill furnished New York with
eleven tons of powder. The New York government
considered the mill's production important enough
to order seven soldiers to guard the site after
local Tories stole seven hundred pounds of the
powder. [4]
In October 1776, John received a commission to
purchase supplies for New York troops. [5] His life
was changed by his purchasing trip to Providence,
Rhode Island where he heard stories of daily
captures of English ships and of great profits made
in privateering. [6] Back home at Clermont, John
became preoccupied with thoughts of making money.
He began to invest in privateering ships and in
January 1777 resigned his commission as major of
the Manor Militia. [7]
With the British occupation of New York City, Boston became a focal point of trade, and in the
fall of 1777 John contemplated the profits to be
drawn from transporting goods from Boston to the
Hudson Valley. Sitting with Henry Livingston over
dinner at Clermont one evening in September, John
asked whether anything could be made in trading in
Boston. Henry responded that "a man with £20,000
could clear a great amount of money." [8] John
envisioned himself making fifteen to twenty percent
on goods sold in Boston and upwards of fifty
percent in the Hudson Valley. With his money tied
up in privateering, John proposed to his brother
that Robert provide £10,000 to be laid out in a
joint account with John doing the business and all
profits and losses equally borne. Robert probably
agreed to this or simply loaned him the money as,
sometime later, John informed Robert that £1,000
was available to him. [9]
By December 1777, John had re-located to
Boston. With the destruction of Clermont by the
British the previous October and the financial
difficulties the family was experiencing, the move
to Boston probably appeared timely. Whether John
pursued a Boston-Hudson Valley trade is hard to
tell, but he did often supply his mother with goods
as well as meeting Robert’s needs, particularly
with liquor, which John imported in great
quantities. [10]
Throughout the years of the Revolution,
merchants developed an almost fanatical pursuit of
profit, and John was not an exception. [11] This
attitude led to troublesome situations which must
have brought some embarrassment to his family. One
such case centered on procuring English goods,
which were in great demand among the populace. An
extensive illicit trade developed during the
Revolution between patriot traders in upstate New
York and New York City British traders. Alexander
Hamilton estimated that by mid-1782, the British in
New York City sold goods upstate amounting to £30,000 a year. John pursued this market in August
1778, when he made an agreement in Rhinebeck with
Samuel Hake, a former New York Loyalist merchant.
Hake was to purchase goods in New York City--up to
£20,000 worth--and John, as an equal partner, was
to dispose of the goods upstate on the best
possible terms. The obstacle in carrying out this
plan was in gaining clearance for Hake to come up
the Hudson River with the goods. Every sloop
stopped on the River had to be reported to General
Washington at Newburgh. John wrote to Hake several
days after their meeting that his brother, Robert,
had spoken with General Washington and passage was
assured. Washington would approve the Hake
sloop. [12] (The story given Washington was
probably that these were personal items of the Hake
and Livingston families.) Hake’s sloop, however,
did not make it beyond Peekskill. Concerned about
the frequent shipment of articles from the enemy in
New York City to points upstate, Governor George
Clinton sought to end this traffic. He had Hake’s
ship stopped and Hake placed under arrest. [13]
John’s sister Janet Montgomery expected goods from
Hake’s ship and wrote Clinton asking for them.
Clinton informed her that Hake’s ship and the goods
on board had been ordered to return to New York
City, when, in fact, the articles were sold and the
money--almost £10,000--was divided among the noncommissioned officers and privates of five
different regiments. [14]
John apparently thought Hake would be released
after a brief detainment as he wrote to Hake to
spare no expense in saving the goods and that he
had another scheme in mind. [15] Hake was not
released, however, and remained under house arrest
in Red Hook, where he seems to have gained much
local support. Seventy-seven residents signed a
petition asking Clinton to release Hake to parole,
which Clinton refused to grant. Hake must have
been rather vociferous in proclaiming his partner’s
role in the affair and in denouncing the Livingston
name, as two of John’s cousins--Robert G., Jr. and
Gilbert R. Livingston--entered Hake’s apartment in
December of 1778 and "beat and bruised him very
much indeed," according to a report made to Clinton
by David Van Ness and Herman Hoffman. [16]
Eventually, Hake was released in an exchange of
prisoners with the British. [17]
A second troublesome incident for John
resulted from a business agreement John made with
Benedict Arnold. In 1778 Arnold assumed command of
Philadelphia after Washington left to pursue
British troops in New Jersey. Arnold schemed with
several Philadelphia merchants to monopolize trade
in that city. He closed stores and shops, even
prevented officers of the army from purchasing
goods, while he privately made purchases on his own
account, and then through his agents sold them
again at exorbitant prices. [18] John, having
learned of Arnold’s command, proposed to buy large
quantities of goods in New York if he could gain
credit there and to send them down to Philadelphia
when possible. [19] The plan never materialized as
Philadelphians grew increasingly disgruntled with
Arnold’s profit scheming, high living, and
socializing with Tory society. Charges against him
were presented to Congress and Arnold left
Philadelphia in February of 1779. [20] The courts
investigating accomplices in Arnold’s later
betrayal at West Point accused John of supplying
Arnold with goods, based on the earlier
Philadelphia agreement. John presented Clinton
with a sworn statement of the limit of his
involvement with Arnold, pointing out that he had
never supplied Arnold nor his men with goods.
Robert also sent a defense of his brother’s
innocence to Clinton. John was cleared of
charges. [21]
John and Robert corresponded regularly
throughout the Revolution. John’s letters to
Robert in his first year in Boston reflected his
concern not only with profit-making but also with
the developments of the Revolution:
I am much chagrined that nothing is done to
raise more troops for the ensuing
Campagne... [and] afraid that Gen. Washington
will be obliged to retreat as soon as the
Enemy come out in the spring, which will be
attended with disagreable consequences, as
the Militia will be backward in turning out
when that is the case. [22]
Along with his opinions on the war, John informed
Robert of the climate of Boston at the end of
October 1778--that the people "are a little
frightened" by several reports of the British fleet
approaching. John urged Robert to write more
frequently to inform him of "what state our publick
affairs are in." [23]
Robert’s concern for John in his first year in
Boston was that John cultivate Boston society. At
Robert’s urging, John visited the Hancocks. John
wrote his brother of the hostility building between
the Hancocks and the Adamses over the latter’s
campaign to replace General Washington with
Gates. [24] After early 1779, however, John’s
letters reflected a total preoccupation with making
money and less concern with the overall picture of
the Revolution. This was due to the financial
responsibilities of taking a wife, building a new
house, and keeping up with the high living that
Boston merchants were known to enjoy.
Robert East in Business Enterprise in the
American Revolutionary Era states that John was
especially active in privateering in Boston. [25] A
privateer at the outbreak of the Revolution was a
ship armed and fitted out at private expense for
the purpose of preying on the enemy’s commerce to
the profit of her owners, and bearing a commission
or letter of marque from the government authorizing
her to do so. Usually the government claimed a
portion of the money realized from the sale of
prizes and their cargoes with a part of it going to
cover court costs which established the legitimacy
of the seizure and the contents of the ship. The
owners of the privateers received the lion’s share
and a considerable portion was divided among the
officers and crew as an additional incentive to
securing prizes. [26] John’s privateering
investments included the following ships. He held
shares in the sloops Beaver, Chance, and Congress;
and held shares in the brigantines Caesar, General
Mifflin, Rising States (carried 480 men and 186
guns & cannon), and Success. He was owner of the
brigantines Charming Peggy (named after John’s wife
Peggy), Robin, and Viper (a 16-gun ship) . [27]
The commonly expressed opinion that
privateering was little better than piracy, Gardner
Allen points out in Massachusetts Privateers of the
Revolution, did not apply to these men.
Privateering served as a temporary navy for
Americans in the Revolution when early efforts to
establish a navy were unsuccessful, and
privateering continued to serve as a force of
harassment of British commercial ships throughout
the Revolutionary War. [28] British merchants lost
ships and cargoes to American privateers not only
along the American coast and in the Caribbean but
also in their own waters off the coasts of Ireland
and England. Examples of encounters of American
privateers with British ships can be seen in
accounts of ships in which John held interests or
owned. The General Mifflin was a 20-gun ship which
in 1778 boldly stationed itself near the British
Coast and made several captures, one of them being
a ship with a cargo of wine. On the Mifflin’s
homeward passage from France, she battled with a
British privateer of eighteen guns and eighty men,
and gained the surrender of the men and the
ship. [29] John’s brigantine Viper sailed from
Boston in October of 1780, and near Cape Hatteras,
its captain, Captain Williams, chased a 16-gun
British privateer of New York City. A cannon
exchange followed when Williams was hit by a musket
ball and the British ship made her escape. The
first officer took charge of the Viper and headed
for the Capes of the Delaware when he encountered
another English ship. The Viper crew succeeded in
capturing the ship, which carried a cargo of beef,
pork, and butter destined for New York City. [30]
Englishmen engaged in trade continually
complained about the loss of ships to American
privateers. For example, in February of 1778
testimony was given in the House of Lords that the
number of ships lost by capture or destruction by
American privateers since the beginning of the war
was 733; their cargoes were estimated to be worth
over ten million dollars. Merchants protested to
Parliment the continuance of the war. [31]
The high rate of capture of British ships
caused insurance rates to escalate and deterred
many English merchants from shipping goods in
English vessels. The solution was to have their
goods shipped in foreign ships. One observer
pointed out that the Thames was the site of unusual
numbers of foreign ships, taking in cargoes of
English commodities for various ports of Europe and
the Caribbean. [32] Thus, the much sought-after
English goods at home were supplied by American
traders, who purchased them in Europe or on St.Eustatius, the Dutch island in the West Indies.
In early 1780, John informed his brother of
his interest in going to Holland to drive a trade
between Holland and St. Eustatius, which became a
war-time international trading mecca and where the
Dutch provided America with needed military
stores. [33] A visitor to the island in 1781
reported over two thousand American merchants and
seamen actively trading. [34] John, having
experienced losses in some of his privateering
ventures and in the devaluation of the pound, was
very anxious to get into the Dutch market and
expressed his willingness to put his Great Patent
land and his New York house and lot up for
mortgage. [35] Instead, he formed a partnership with
David Dickson, who stationed himself at St.
Eustatius, and with a Mr. Stockholm, who
established himself in Amsterdam. John remained in
Boston. Goods sent from Holland to the Dutch
island, John informed Robert, could net fifty
percent profit in hard money; tobacco, in turn,
could be purchased cheaply at St. Eustatius and
sent to Europe where it sold for high prices. [36]
John was restless at home, however, and
desperate to make a fortune before the close of the
war. Upon hearing that some American patriot
merchants were boldly entering British harbors,
buying English goods directly, and then selling
them in New York for a sizeable profit, John could
not be held back. He planned to enter this market
and presented his deal to Robert Morris, a
successful merchant and future secretary of
finance, in hopes of gaining financial backing.
Morris disapproved and castigated John for wanting
to trade with the enemy. Morris was sure that Dr.
Franklin would not grant such a permit. John felt
Morriss’ objection was a matter of opinion and
believed that Franklin would allow any person a
pass upon taking an oath of allegiance. [37] It
took Robert to talk him out of it. Robert asked
for John’s promise to confine his trade to Holland
and France, to which John reluctantly agreed. [38]
John’s financial condition must have appeared grave
at this point as he confessed to Robert "poverty is
a curse I can’t bear with it a man had better not
exist and you must know that the family are too
much distressed themselves to afford me any
assistance." [39]
Robert proved to be a very patient and caring
brother to John, who asked favors in letter after
letter. In late 1781, John asked Robert to work at
getting him appointed agent for supplying the
French ships. [40] John later learned that the
French were supplying their own war commissary. In
early 1782, he appealed to Robert in Philadelphia
to influence Robert Morris, now secretary of
finance, to appoint him agent for the Continental
navy, even though there were only a few ships at
the time. Still, he told Robert,
It may lead to something more should the War
continue & Congress fit out some ships.. .and
what will be of still greater importance is
that a man is considered of much more
consequence by having a publick commission of
that kind especially in Europe where I could
wish our Credit to be in good estimation....
This is a matter that may be a means of
making my fortune, and everything should be
tryed to obtain it. [41]
When he learned that Morris had already appointed
an agent, he thanked Robert for his efforts and
lapsed into a temporary depression.
John soon recovered when fifty thousand livres
arrived from France sent by Dickson and
Stockholm, and he renewed his efforts to expand
his trade contacts in Europe. [43] In July 1782,
John reported that he and his partners could get
almost any quantity of goods in France, Holland,
England, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium,
but that they were not fully established in all
the trading houses of Europe. He therefore asked
Robert to procure letters of recommendation--pointing out that the more letters he had, the
cheaper the goods would be. A letter from Robert
Morris, whose father ran a large manufactory of
cotton goods in France, was greatly desired. [44]
The concern among merchants in general, in
1782, was when the war would end. Many
merchants, anticipating a difficult aftermath,
keenly watched the approach of peace. [45] John
hoped his brother could forecast this time and
stated: "I wish extremely, to know whether we
shall have a peace this year as we are dipping
very largely into business--and if it takes place
without a proper warning may ruin us." [46] For
their own interests, the merchants hoped the war
would last long enough to realize their hoped-for
fortunes, but John allowed that his personal gain
would be trivial when compared to the happiness
of thousands. Facing the reality of a coming
peace, John informed Robert he would arrange his
affairs so as not to be much injured by the War’s
end. [47] Still, at the close of the war, John
was disappointed that he had not made the fortune
he so single mindedly worked toward.
I have tried to show that John R.
Livingston, like other merchants, had few
scruples about exploiting the Revolutionary War
to advance his financial situation. Yet one must
recognize that in his drive toward wealth,
specifically through privateering, he contributed
to the ending of the war and to the winning of
America’s independence. Edgar Maclay states: "In
all the memorials presented to Parliament the
arguments used to bring about peace with America
was the unprecedented destruction of British
commerce." [48]
Notes
- Edwin Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons
of Livingston Manor (New York: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1910), pp. 229, 522, 530,
536, 556.
- American Archives, Fourth Series, Vol. V
(Washington, D.C.: Peter Force, 1853) p. 378.
- American Archives, Fifth Series, Vol. I
(Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clair Clarke and
Peter Force, 1853) p. 144.
- Journals of the Provincial Congress, Vol. I
(Albany: Thurlow Weed, 1842) p. 551.
- American Archives, Sixth Series, Vol. III
(Washington, D.C.: Peter Force, 1853) p. 218.
- John R. Livingston to Robert R. Livingston,
October 11, 1776, Robert R. Livingston Papers
(Sanford, N.C.: Microfilm Corporation of
America, 1980?) reel 1.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., August 29, 1777.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., December 18, 1777.
- Robert East, Business Enterprise in the
American Revolutionary Era (New York: AMS
Press, Inc., 1969) p. 81.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. V
(Albany: James B. Lyon, 1901) pp. 298-299.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. IV
(Albany: James B. Lyon, 1900) p. 233.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. V. p.
739.
- Ibid., p. 298.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. IV, pp.
333—334.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VII,
(Albany: James B. Lyon, 1904) p. 158.
- J. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History
of Philadelphia 1609—1884 Vol. I (Philadelphia:
L.H. Everts & Co., 1884) pp. 388-391.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VI
(Albany: James B. Lyon, 1902) pp. 428-430.
- Scharf and Wescott, pp. 338-391.
- Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VI, pp.
42 8—4 30
- John R. Livingston to Robert R. Livingston,
March 10, 1778.
- Ibid., February 24, 1778.
- Ibid.
- East, p. 66.
- Ibid., p. 7.
- JRL to RRL, October 11, 1776, reel 1; JRL to
RRL, May 5, 1782, Reel 2; Gardner Allen,
Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927),
pp. 96, 148, 265, 317; Library of Congress,
Naval Records of the American Revolution,
1775-1788 (WasTiington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1906) p. 466.
- Allen, p. 15.
- Edgar S. Maclay, A History of American
Privateers (CambrIdge: Harvard University
Press, 1927) p. 88.
- Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
- Ibid., pp. xii, xiii.
- Allen, p. 18.
- JRL to RRL, February 13, 1780, reel 1.
- East, p. 177.
- JRL to RRL, March 29, 1780, reel 1.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., August 7, 1780, reel 1.
- Ibid., November 15, 1780, reel 1.
- Ibid., December 19, 1781, reel 2.
- Ibid., March 28, 1782, reel 2.
- Ibid., May 5, 1782, reel 2.
- Ibid., July 17, 1782, reel 2.
- Ibid.
- East, p. 245.
- JRL to RRL, undated, reel 2, frame 700.
- Ibid., September 4, 1782, reel 2.
- Maclay, p. xiii.
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